Abstract-In this paper, we study the secrecy capacity of Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channels (WTCs) with a finite memory, subject to a per-symbol average power constraint on the MIMO channel input. MIMO channels with finite memory are very common in wireless communications as well as in wireline communications (e.g., in communications over power lines). To derive the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian MIMO WTC with finite memory, we first construct an asymptotically equivalent block-memoryless MIMO WTC, which is then transformed into a set of parallel, independent, memoryless MIMO WTCs in the frequency domain. The secrecy capacity of the Gaussian MIMO WTC with finite memory is obtained as the secrecy capacity of the set of parallel, independent, memoryless MIMO WTCs, and is expressed as maximization over the input covariance matrices in the frequency domain. Finally, we detail two applications of our result: First, we show that the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian scalar WTC with finite memory can be achieved by waterfilling, and obtain a closed-form expression for this secrecy capacity. Then, we use our result to characterize the secrecy capacity of narrowband powerline channels, thereby resolving one of the major open issues for this channel model. Index Terms-Physical layer security, MIMO channels, channels with memory, wiretap channels.
O
NE of the main challenges in the design of communications schemes for shared channels is to reliably transmit information to a destination, while keeping potential eavesdroppers ignorant of the transmitted information. The fundamental model for studying secure physical-layer communications over shared mediums is the wiretap channel (WTC) model [1] , which consists of three terminals: A transmitter (Tx), an intended receiver (Rx), and an eavesdropper (Ev). The secrecy capacity is defined as the maximum information rate for reliable Tx-Rx communications such that the rate of information leaked to the eavesdropper asymptotically vanishes. The initial study of WTCs detailed in [1] , considered memoryless WTCs in which the channel inputs and the channel outputs are discrete random variables (RVs) with finite alphabets, and the Tx-Ev channel is a physically degraded version of the Tx-Rx channel. The general discrete memoryless WTC was studied in [2] , which characterized its secrecy capacity by introducing a virtual channel, also referred to as prefix channel [3, Ch. 3.5] . Memoryless scalar WTCs with additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) were first studied in [4] , which made three important observations: (1) No prefix channel is required, (2) Gaussian codebooks are optimal, and (3) The secrecy capacity is zero when the noise power at the intended receiver is equal to or greater than the noise power at the eavesdropper. Several works studied the fundamental limits of secure communications over memoryless WTCs with AWGN and multiple antennas at the terminals, referred to as the multipleinput multiple-output (MIMO) WTC: The work [5] considered the scenario of two antennas at the Tx, two antennas at the Rx, and one antenna at the Ev, where the channel input is subject to a per-codeword average power constraint. The secrecy capacity of MIMO WTCs with an arbitrary number of antennas at each node was derived in [6] subject to a percodeword average power constraint, and in [7] subject to a per-symbol average power constraint. An alternative derivation of the secrecy capacity of MIMO WTCs was carried out in [8] , subject to a more general input covariance matrix constraint. In [8, Corollary 1] it is shown that the secrecy capacity subject to a per-codeword average power constraint on the input can be obtained as a corollary of the main result of [8] . The more general scenario of AWGN MIMO broadcast channels with confidential messages was studied in [9] - [11] . Similarly to the scalar Gaussian case, the secrecy capacity of MIMO WTCs with AWGN is achieved by using a Gaussian codebook without channel prefixing, where the secrecy capacity expression is stated as an optimization over all possible input covariance matrices which satisfy a specified power constraint. This optimization problem was shown to be non-convex [6] , [12] - [14] , and methods for approaching the maximizing input covariance matrix were proposed in several works. In particular, [12] proposed an algorithm based on alternating optimization for approaching the optimal covariance matrix, [13] studied the conditions for the covariance matrix to be full rank and characterized the optimal covariance matrix for this case, and in [14] rank deficient solutions for the optimal covariance matrix were proposed. Secrecy in the presence of temporally correlated Gaussian noise was studied in [15] , which considered scalar degraded 0018-9448 © 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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block-memoryless WTCs with additive colored Gaussian noise. Additional scenarios of physical-layer security in modern networks include fading WTCs, studied in [16] - [18] , independent parallel channels, studied in [19] , [20] , and an achievable secrecy rate for multi-carrier systems, characterized in [21] and [22] . The wiretap framework was further extended to multi-user channels in [23] - [26] (see also detailed surveys in [27] , [3, Ch. 8] , and [28, Ch. 22] ). The secrecy capacity of arbitrary wiretap channels was studied in [29] , yet, the expression derived in [29, Thm. 1] is rather involved and does not identify the input distribution which maximizes the secrecy rate. Finally, we note that a suboptimal precoding scheme for block frequency-selective scalar WTCs with AWGN was proposed in [30] .
In this paper we study the secrecy capacity of MIMO Gaussian WTCs with finite memory, i.e., MIMO Gaussian WTCs in which the channel introduces intersymbol interference (ISI) of a finite duration at each receive antenna, and the noise is an additive stationary colored Gaussian process whose temporal correlation has a finite length. This channel model applies to many communications scenarios, including wireless communications and power line communications. However, despite the importance of this model as a fundamental model for secure modern communications, the secrecy capacity of Gaussian finite-memory MIMO WTCs and also of Gaussian finite-memory scalar WTCs has not been characterized to date.
Main Contributions: In this paper we derive the secrecy capacity of Gaussian MIMO WTCs with finite memory, subject to a per-MIMO symbol average power constraint on the channel input, where the transmitter knows both the Tx-Rx channel and the Tx-Ev channel. To this aim, we first construct a block-memoryless Gaussian MIMO WTC based on the characteristics of the original finite-memory Gaussian MIMO WTC, and prove that the two channel models are asymptotically equivalent. Then, we transform the block-memoryless channel into an equivalent set of parallel memoryless Gaussian MIMO WTCs, for which the secrecy capacity has been characterized in [19] . Our derivation uses concepts from the derivation of the (non-secure) capacity of finite-memory Gaussian point-to-point channels [31] , multiple-access channels (MACs) [32] , and broadcast channels (BCs) [33] , as well as introduce novel techniques and schemes for the analysis of the information leakage rate at the eavesdropper. For the special case of the scalar Gaussian WTC with finite memory, we show that the secrecy capacity can be obtained via the waterfilling power allocation scheme, and demonstrate the resulting rate via a numerical example. Finally, we show how our result directly leads to the secrecy capacity of narrowband powerline communications (PLC) channels, which is a major challenge in smart grid communications networks [34] . Our results provide insights on the relationship between these seemingly different problems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces the problem formulation; Section III derives the secrecy capacity for finite-memory Gaussian MIMO WTCs; Section IV discusses the results and their application to PLC, and provides a numerical example; Lastly, Section V provides some concluding remarks.
II. NOTATIONS AND PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. Notations
We use upper-case letters to denote random variables (RVs), e.g., X, and calligraphic letters to denote sets, e.g., X . We denote column vectors with boldface letters, e.g., X; the k-th element of a vector X (k ≥ 0) is denoted with (X) k . Matrices are denoted with Sans-Sarif fonts, e.g., M; the element at the k-th row and the l-th column of a matrix M is denoted by (M) k,l . We use I a to denote the a × a identity matrix, and 0 a×b to denote the all-zero a × b matrix. Hermitian transpose, transpose, trace, complex conjugate, and stochastic expectation are denoted by (·) H , (·) T , Tr(·), (·) * , and E{·}, respectively. We use I (X; Y ) to denote the mutual information between the RVs X ∈ X and Y ∈ Y, H (X) to denote the entropy of a discrete RV X, h(X) to denote the differential entropy of a continuous RV X, and p(X) to denote the probability density function (PDF) of a continuous RV X. The symbol d = denotes equality in distribution, and we use j to denote √ −1; All logarithms are taken to base 2. The sets of integers, nonnegative integers, real numbers, and complex numbers are denoted by Z, N, R, and C, respectively. We use ((a)) b to denote "a modulo b", i.e., writing c = ((a)) b implies that c is satisfies the relationship a = k · b + c, where k ∈ Z and 0 ≤ c < b. We use a + to denote max {0, a}, and |·| to denote the magnitude when applied to scalars, and the determinant operator when applied to matrices.
For any sequence, possibly multivariate, denote the n-point DFT of the multivariate sequence
B. Channel Model
We consider the n t × n r × n e MIMO WTC with finite memory. Let m be a non-negative integer which denotes the length of the memory of the channel, and let W[i ] ∈ R n r and U[i ] ∈ R n e be two multivariate, zero-mean stationary real Gaussian processes with autocorrelation functions [τ ] , τ ∈ Z, are assumed to be a-priori known at the transmitter. We refer to this assumption as Tx-CSI. The input-output relationships for the linear time-invariant (LTI) Gaussian MIMO WTC (LGMWTC) are given by
i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , l − 1}, l ∈ N, where the channel inputs are subject to a per-MIMO symbol power constraint (hereafter referred to as per-symbol power constraint for brevity)
i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , l − 1}. We note that restricting the power of the information symbols at all time instants, rather than over the entire codeword, is very common in the design of practical communications systems, since the dynamic range of practical power amplifiers is limited [35, Ch. 09] , rendering it impossible for transmitters to "store" power for later channel uses. This constraint is therefore a natural model for energyconstrained channels [31, Sec. I-A]. It should also be noted that similar constraints were used in related works, e.g., the derivation of the secrecy capacity of memoryless MIMO channels in [7] , as well as in the derivation of some major information theoretic results including [31] , [36, Section VII] , and [37] . In this work we characterize the secrecy capacity of the LGMWTC.
C. Definitions
The framework used in this study is based on the following definitions:
Definition 1: A MIMO WTC with memory, in which the transmitter has n t antennas, the intended receiver has n r antennas, and the eavesdropper has n e antennas, abbreviated as the n t × n r × n e MIMO WTC, consists of an input stream X[i ] ∈ R n t , two output streams Y[i ] ∈ R n r and Z[i ] ∈ R n e , observed by the intended receiver and by the eavesdropper, respectively, i ∈ N, an initial state S 0 ∈ S 0 , and a sequence of transition probabilities p
In this work we focus on the LGMWTC, which is an instance of the general class of MIMO WTCs with memory defined above. From Def. 1 it follows that the initial state of the LGMWTC is given by
. Note that complex MIMO WTCs with memory can be accommodated by the setup of Def. 1 by representing all complex vectors using real vectors having twice the number of elements and, representing the complex channel matrices using real matrices having four times the number of elements, corresponding to the real parts and the imaginary parts of the entries, see, e.g., [37, Sec. I]. Note that we follow the standard setup for channels with memory and let the encoder and decoder operate using only the l symbols corresponding to the currently transmitted codeword [31] - [33] , [38, Ch. 5.9] , [39] . The encoder is assumed to be independent of the initial state S 0 .
Definition 3: The average probability of error of an [R, l] code, when the initial state is s 0 , is defined as: 
and 
Def. 6 corresponds to the general notion of memoryless channels as in, e.g., [41, . Note that if there is no feedback to the transmitter, it follows that
Then, Def. 6 implies that for every positive integer l,
which also coincides with the definition of memoryless WTCs stated in [3, Ch. 3.5] . We henceforth assume that no feedback is present in any of the channels considered. 
.
Def. 7 corresponds to the definition of n-block memoryless BCs stated in [33, Eq. (8) ]. Note that codewords of any length can be transmitted over n-block memoryless channels, however, when the length of the codeword is an integer multiple of the channel block memory n, then the average probability of error is independent of the initial state S 0 [33, Sec. II], and similarly, the information leakage rate is also independent of S 0 . This follows since the outputs of the channels at the receiver and at the eavesdropper corresponding to the transmitted codeword are independent of the initial channel state, by the definition of the channel.
III. THE SECRECY CAPACITY OF THE LGMWTC
Our main result is the characterization of the secrecy capacity of the LTI Gaussian MIMO WTC with finite memory, defined in Subsection II-B. This secrecy capacity is stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 1: Consider the LGMWTC defined in (2) subject to the per-symbol power constraint (3) and with Tx-CSI.
H [τ ] e − j ωτ , and
Let C P denote the set of n t × n t positive semi-definite Hermitian matrix functions C X (ω), defined over the interval
and define ψ(ω) as:
Then, the secrecy capacity of the LGMWTC is given by
In the proof we use elements from the capacity derivation for the finite-memory MAC [32] and BC [33] , as well as novel approach and techniques for analyzing the information leakage rate.
Proof Outline: First, for n > 2m, we define the n-block memoryless circular Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel (n-CGMWTC) as follows: 
when the noise samples belong to the same n-block. Noise samples that belong to different n-blocks are independent since the channel is n-block memoryless. The outputs of the n-CGMWTC over any given n-block, i.e., for i = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1, are defined as
The n-CGMWTC is subject to the same per-symbol average power constraints as the LGMWTC, stated in (3) . Note that the definition of the n-CGMWTC is a natural extension of the definition of the n-block memoryless circular Gaussian channel (without secrecy), defined in [33, Sec. II], to secure communications.
The proof now proceeds in the following steps:
• In Subsection III-A, we prove that the secrecy capacity of the LGMWTC can be obtained from the secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC by taking n → ∞. Note that while the asymptotic relationship between finitememory channels and their circular block-memoryless counterparts has been used in the (non-secure) capacity analysis of finite-memory Gaussian channels in, e.g., [31] , [32] , and [33] , to the best of our knowledge, this is the first time this approach is applied in the study of the secrecy capacity, and in such scenarios analyzing the information leakage presents a substantial challenge, as is evident from the analysis in Appendix A.
• Next, in Subsection III-B, we derive a closed-form expression for the secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC for a finite n.
• Lastly, in Subsection III-C, we let n → ∞ and use the capacity expression derived for the n-CGMWTC in Subsection III-B, to obtain an explicit optimization problem whose maximal solution is the secrecy capacity of the LGMWTC.
A. Equivalence Between the Secrecy Capacity of the LGMWTC and the Asymptotic Secrecy Capacity of the n-CGMWTC
We now show that the secrecy capacity of the finite-memory LTI Gaussian MIMO WTC can be obtained as the secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC, by taking n → ∞. Letting C n−CG s denote the secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC, the result is summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1: The secrecy capacity of the LGMWTC defined in (2), subject to the power constraint (3) can be written as
(9) Proof: We provide here an outline of the proof; The detailed proof is provided in Appendix A. First, recall that the n-CGMWTC is defined for n > 2m. Next, for n > 2m we define the n-block memoryless Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel (n-MGMWTC) as follows: The n-MGMWTC is obtained from the LGMWTC by considering the last n − m vector channel outputs out of each n-block at both the eavesdropper and the receiver, i.e., the outputs of the n-MGMWTC are defined as the outputs of the LGMWTC for 0 ≤ ((i )) n ≥ m, while for ((i )) n < m the outputs of the n-MGMWTC are not defined, see, e.g., [40] . The n-MGMWTC is subject to the power constraint (3) on the channel input, similarly to the LGMWTC. With this definition, we formulate the secrecy capacity of the n-MGMWTC in the form of the result of Csiszár and Körner [2, Eq. (11)]. Note that since the LGMWTC is transformed into the n-MGMWTC by setting the first m vector channel outputs out of each n-block of channel outputs to be "undefined" (see also, e.g., [33, Appendix A]), then by construction the codeword transmission starts at the beginning of an n-block, i.e., an n-block begins at time i = 0. Next, we show that the secrecy capacity of the LGMWTC can be obtained as the secrecy capacity of the n-MGMWTC by taking n → ∞. For nonsecure communications over BCs, it immediately follows that the capacity of the n-block memoryless Gaussian BC is not larger than the capacity of the LTI Gaussian BC, as the n-block memoryless Gaussian BC is a special case of the LTI Gaussian BC, obtained by letting the intended receiver discard m channel outputs out of every block of n received channel outputs, as was already shown in [33, Appendix A] . However, in the secure setup, this no longer holds, as the decoder at the eavesdropper cannot be forced to discard m vector channel outputs out of every block of n received channel outputs, and we conclude that such an inequality relationship between the secrecy capacities of the n-MGMWTC and of the LGMWTC can be proved only for the asymptotic case n → ∞. This presents a fundamental difference from nonsecure scenarios as will be elaborated in Comment A.2 in Appendix A. Lastly, we show that in the asymptotic regime of n → ∞, the n-MGMWTC and the n-CGMWTC have the same secrecy capacity, from which we conclude that C s is the secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC, in the limit n → ∞. 
B. Characterizing the Secrecy Capacity of the n-CGMWTC
Next, we derive C n−CG s for a fixed and finite n > 2m. The derivation begins with applying the DFT to each n-block
The secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC for a fixed and finite n is stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 2: LetĈ n P denote the collection of n-sets of n t ×n t positive semi-definite Hermitian matrices
Further defineψ [k] as:
The secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC defined in (8) , for a fixed and finite n, subject to the per-symbol constraint (3) is
Proof: A detailed proof is provided in Appendix B, and in the following we present only the outline of the proof: By applying the multivariate DFT to the channel outputs of the n-CGMWTC, we obtain an equivalent set of n MIMO WTCs in the frequency domain, such that each component WTC has no ISI and has additive Gaussian noise. We then show that the noise components in the equivalent set of n MIMO WTCs at different frequency indexes are mutually independent and that each noise component is a circularly symmetric complex normal random process, i.i.d. across different n-blocks. Next, relaxing the power constraint to the per n-block power constraint, it follows that the equivalent set of n parallel MIMO WTCs can be analyzed as a set of independent parallel memoryless MIMO WTCs with additive circularly symmetric complex normal noise, i.i.d. in time (here, we refer to the frequency index as "time"). The secrecy rate of the component MIMO WTCs for a given power allocation, has already been established in [6] and [7] . In Prop. 2 we state that the secrecy rate of the equivalent set of n MIMO WTCs subject to a given power allocation for each subchannel can be written as the sum of the secrecy rates of the independent subchannels, divided by the number of subchannels. In order to arrive at this expression, we use an obvious extension of [19, Thm. 1] to the memoryless Gaussian MIMO case. The secrecy capacity for the equivalent set of n parallel MIMO WTCs is obtained by maximizing over all secrecy rates which satisfy the relaxed sum-power constraint, eventually resulting in (10) . Lastly, we show that the channel input which achieves the secrecy capacity satisfies the per-symbol average power constraint (3), hence (10) characterizes the secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC subject to (3).
C. The Secrecy Capacity of the LGMWTC
In the final step, we first derive the asymptotic expression for C n−CG s in the limit of n → ∞. Then, we obtain C s as the limit lim [43, Ch. 6] , it follows that for n → ∞, (10c) converges to (6c), and that the energy constraint in (10a) asymptotically coincides with the energy constraint in (6a).
From Proposition 1 it follows that C s = lim n→∞ C n−CG s . Therefore, it follows from Proposition 3 that C s is given by (6) , which completes the proof of Thm. 1.
IV. DISCUSSION AND NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In the following we discuss the insights obtained from the results derived above. In Subsection IV-A we present a necessary and sufficient condition for non-zero secrecy capacity; Then, in Subsection IV-B we present the application of our result to the characterization of the secrecy capacity of narrowband PLC channels; Lastly, in Subsection IV-C we show that the secrecy capacity of the scalar finite-memory LTI Gaussian WTC can be obtained in closed-form, and provide numerical examples.
A. Necessary and Sufficient Condition for C s > 0
The secrecy capacity expression (6c) is the solution to a non-convex optimization problem (see, e.g., [6] for the memoryless case), which makes it hard to directly develop a practical interpretation. To assist with the understanding of Thm. 1 , we now present a necessary and sufficient condition for non-zero secrecy capacity, which follows from Thm. 1.
ω). The secrecy capacity of the LGMWTC is strictly positive if and only if
Proof: The proof is similar to that of [6, Corollary 2] , and is provided in Appendix C.
Note that the vector v (ω) can be considered as a beamforming vector. Therefore, Proposition 4 implies that the secrecy capacity is strictly positive only when there exists a continuous set of frequencies for which the sender can beamform the transmitted signal such that the intended receiver observes a higher SNR than the eavesdropper at each frequency in the set of frequencies.
B. Application: The Secrecy Capacity of Narrowband PLC Channels
An important application of our result is the characterization of the secrecy capacity of scalar PLC channels in the frequency range of 3 − 500 kHz, referred to as narrowband (NB) PLC. NB-PLC plays an important role in the realization of smart power grids [44] , in which secure communications is a critical issue [44] - [46] . Despite the importance of secure NB-PLC, to date there is no characterization of the secrecy capacity for this channel, which accounts for its unique characteristics [34] : The NB-PLC channel is a linear channel with additive noise , in which the channel impulse response (CIR) is commonly modeled as a real periodically time-varying signal with a finite memory [47] , [48] , while the additive noise is commonly modeled as a real cyclostationary Gaussian process with a finite correlation length [48] , [49] . In the following we fill the knowledge gap of secure communications rates over NB-PLC channels by characterizing the secrecy capacity of the NB-PLC wiretap channel.
Let W PLC [i ] and U PLC [i ] be zero-mean scalar additive cyclostationary Gaussian noises (ACGNs), each with a period of t noise and a temporal correlation which has a finite-duration, whose length is m noise . Let m ch be a non-negative integer representing the length of the memory of the NB-PLC CIR, and let {h
τ =0 denote the channel coefficients of the Tx-Rx channel and of the Tx-Ev channel, respectively, both with period 1 
We use X[i ] to denote the transmitted scalar signal, and Y PLC [i ] and Z PLC [i ] to denote the channel outputs at the destination and at the eavesdropper, respectively, all at time i . The input-output relationships of the NB-PLC WTC can be written as
Set n PLC to be the least common multiple of t ch and t noise which satisfies n PLC > m PLC . We assume that the channel input is subject to an average power constraint
for any blocklength l, and we assume that for all i ≥ 0 it holds that
i.e., over any block of n PLC symbols, starting from the first transmitted symbol, the average power is upper bound by P. 
In NB-PLC systems, t ch is equal to the mains period and t noise is equal to half the mains period [48] . However, our secrecy capacity result applies also to the more general case in which the periods of the Tx-Rx CIR and of the Tx-Ev CIR are not identical, by setting t ch to be the least common multiple of these periods. The same applies to the noises and t noise , see further explanations in [51, Footnote 1].
and U PLC ĩ are each a stationary Gaussian process. Let C W PLC τ and C U PLC τ denote the autocorrelation function of W PLC ĩ and the autocorrelation function of U PLC ĩ , respectively. Finally, let H PLC τ and G PLC τ ,τ ∈ {0, 1}, be n PLC × n PLC matrices whose entries at the k 1 -th row and the k 2 -th column are given in (14) , as shown at the bottom of this page ∀k 1 , k 2 ∈ N PLC .
The secrecy capacity of the NB-PLC WTC is stated in the following corollary:
Corollary 1: Consider the NB-PLC WTC defined in (12) , subject to the power constraints (13) . Define C W PLC (ω)
and define ψ PLC (ω) as:
Then, the secrecy capacity of the NB-PLC WTC is given by
Proof: The proof follows from the representation of NB-PLC channels as Gaussian MIMO channels with finite memory, see, e.g., [51, Appendix B] , and is provided in Appendix D.
C. Scalar Gaussian WTCs With Finite Memory
To analytically evaluate (6c) it is required to search over all possible input correlation matrix functions in C P . However, for the special case of the scalar linear Gaussian WTC (LGWTC), obtained from the general model by setting n t = n r = n e = 1, the secrecy capacity can be obtained explicitly. This result is stated in the following corollary:
Corollary 2: Consider the scalar LGWTC. Define the
, and α e (ω)
, where the domain for all the functions is [0, π). The secrecy capacity of the scalar LGWTC is given by
and μ > 0 is selected such that
Proof: For the scalar n-block memoryless circular Gaussian WTC (n-CGWTC), define the scalar functionŝ 
where
and μ > 0 is selected such that over n samples of a Riemann integrable even function 2 over the range [0, 2π). Therefore, from [43, Ch. 6] , it follows for n → ∞, (17a) coincides with (16a). As these steps are essentially the same as the steps in the proof of Proposition 3, they are not repeated here.
While Corollary 2 applies only to scalar Gaussian WTCs with finite memory, it facilitates a deeper understanding of the main result stated in Thm. 1: Recall that for scalar Gaussian WTCs without memory, i.e., without ISI and with AWGN, the secrecy capacity is zero if the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the intended receiver (SNR r ) is less than or equal to the SNR at the eavesdropper (SNR e ) [4] . In contrast, Corollary 2 and Proposition 4 imply that for scalar Gaussian WTCs with finite memory, the secrecy capacity is zero if and only if α r (ω) ≤ α e (ω) for all sets ⊂ [0, π) of positive Lebesgue measure. This implies that C s,Scalar is zero if and only if the "SNR density" at the intended receiver, i.e.,
, is less than that at the eavesdropper, i.e.,
, over the entire frequency range. It thus follows that the finite memory of the channel introduces additional degrees-of-freedom for concealing the information from the eavesdropper. To demonstrate this, consider the following two-tap channels to the receiver and to the eavesdropper, respectively: h (ω) = 1 + e − j ω and g (ω) = 3.1 −3.1e − j ω . Let the noises in both channels be AWGN with unit variance, thus, SNR r ≈ 3[dB] while SNR e ≈ 13 [dB] . The magnitude of the frequency response for these two channels is depicted in Fig. 1 . From the above discussion it follows that the shaded region in which |h (ω) | ≥ |g (ω) | facilitates a positive secrecy capacity, and this is achieved by waterfilling over this region according to (16b). Therefore, although SNR e is 10[dB] higher than SNR r , the secrecy capacity of this channel, derived via (16), is 0.21 bits per channel use.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we characterized for the first time the secrecy capacity of finite-memory MIMO Gaussian WTCs. 2 The function is even in the sense that for 1
The secrecy capacity is derived via the analysis of an equivalent multivariate block-memoryless channel model, and the result is stated as a maximization over the input covariance matrices in the frequency domain. Based on the capacity characterization we were able to characterize a necessary and sufficient condition for non-zero secrecy capacity. We also derived the secrecy capacity of narrowband PLC channels, as a special case of the main result, thereby resolving one of the major open problems for this communications channel. For the scalar case, we explicitly demonstrated that the frequency selectivity of the channel can be utilized to facilitate secure communications over scenarios in which the SNR at the intended receiver is less than the SNR at the eavesdropper.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1 In order to prove that C s is obtained from C n−CG s by taking n → ∞, we begin by characterizing the secrecy capacity of the n-MGMWTC, which was defined in the proof outline in Subsection III-A. This capacity is characterized in Subsection A-A. Then, in Subsection A-B we show that C s can be obtained from the secrecy capacity of the n-MGMWTC by taking n → ∞. Lastly, in Subsection A-C we show that for n → ∞, the secrecy capacity of the n-MGMWTC is equal to the secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC. Combining these results we obtain (9) . Define
A. Characterizing the Secrecy Capacity of the n-MGMWTC
The secrecy capacity of the n-MGMWTC is stated in the following proposition: Then, we show that any secrecy rate achievable for the n-MGMWTC can be achieved by considering only codes whose blocklength is an integer multiple of n.
Let us consider the n-MGMWTC constrained to using only codes whose blocklength is an integer multiple of n. In this case, we can represent the channel as an equivalent n · n t × (n − m) · n r × (n − m) · n e MIMO WTC (without loss of information), via the following assignments: Define the input of the transformed channel at time i ∈ N by the n ·n t ×1 vector X eq ĩ X ĩ +1 ·n−1 i·n ,ĩ ≥ 0, the output at the intended receiver at time i ∈ N by the (n − m) · n r × 1 vector
, and the output at the eavesdropper
. The transformation is clearly bijective, and thus, the secrecy capacity of the equivalent channel is equal to the secrecy capacity of the original n-MGMWTC. Since the n-MGMWTC is n-block memoryless, it follows from Def. 6 that the equivalent transformed MIMO channel obtained above is memoryless, with the transmitter having n times more antennas than in the n-MGMWTC, and both the intended receiver and the eavesdropper having (n − m) times more antennas than in the n-MGMWTC. The signals received at the intended receiver and at the eavesdropper are corrupted by the additive noise vectors W eq ĩ W 
where (a) follows from the definition of the quantities used in the equivalent channel, and E X[i ] 2 ≤ P, ∀0 ≤ i < n corresponds to the per-symbol power constraint of the n-MGMWTC. As every channel use in the transformed MIMO channel corresponds to n channel uses in the n-MGMWTC, it follows from (A.2) that the maximal achievable secrecy rate of the n-MGMWTC in bits per channel use, subject to the restriction that only codes whose blocklength is an integer multiple of n are allowed, is
Next, we show that any secrecy rate achievable for the n-MGMWTC can be achieved by considering only codes whose blocklength is an integer multiple of n: Consider a secrecy rate R s achievable for the n-MGMWTC and fix codes whose blocklength is an integer multiple of n. We thus conclude that C n−MG s is the maximum achievable secrecy rate for the n-MGMWTC.
B. Proving That
Next, we prove that the secrecy capacity of the LGMWTC, C s , coincides with C n−MG s in the limit of n → ∞. We begin by defining
The outline of the proof is as follows:
• First, we show in Lemma A.1 and Lemma A.2 that for the LGMWTC (2), the mutual information between the channel inputs and any m channel outputs can be upper bounded by a fixed and finite number. 
We now provide a sketch of the proof of the lemma;
The detailed proof appears in [64] . From the input-output relationship of the LGMWTC (2) it follows that any sequence of k > 0 consecutive channel outputs corresponding to indexes i 0 , i 0 + 1, . . . , i 0 + k − 1, when their subsequent and preceding channel outputs are given, depends on the channel inputs at indexes i 0 − m, i 0 − m + 1, . . . , i 0 + k − 1, due to the finite length of the channel impulse response, and the dependence extends also to the channel inputs at indexes {i 0 − 2m, i 0 − 2m +1, . . . , i 0 −m −1}∪{i 0 +k, i 0 +k +1 . . . , i 0 +k +m −1}, due to the temporal span of the noise correlation. The latter follows as, given the corresponding channel outputs, these inputs are statistically dependent on the noise at these indexes. Therefore, similarly to the derivation in [53, Eq. (63) - (65)], we obtain that each of the two conditional mutual information expressions in (A.4) is upper-bounded by the mean of a quadratic function of at most 4m channel inputs. Since the channel input X[i ] is subject to a per-symbol power constraint, the lemma follows.
Lemma A.2: There exists a finite and fixedη > 0, such that for any positive integer n > 2m, and for all initial states s 0 ∈ S 0 , it holds that
where (a) follows since conditioning reduces entropy [52, Ch. 8.6] . From the input-output relationship of the LGMWTC it follows that
where (a) follows as S 0 = X 
We note that as the noise samples are not linearly dependent, 4 it follows that Q > 0 [57, Ch. 
where Q is positive, finite, and independent of n. Next, note that Defining γ k as γ k m·n t −1 
It follows that |K Y | is positive, finite, and independent of n. Plugging (A.9) and (A.10) into (A.6) leads to 
1: Note that the per-symbol power constraint (3) is required in the proofs of Lemmas A.1 and A.2 in order to upper bound the mutual information between a transmitted block of b · n + a channel inputs (for Lemma A.1) or n channel inputs (for Lemma A.2) and a received block of m channel outputs, by a finite quantity independent of n. Consequently, the per-symbol constraint is essential for
where (a) follows from (4a) since Pr M =M S 0 =s 0 ≤ sup
where (a) follows from (A.12) and from (4b), as I M; Z n−1 S 0 =s 0 ≤ sup
and (b) follows since M is uniformly distributed and is independent of S 0 . Combining (4c) and (A.13) leads to
where (a) follows since we can define a pair V n−1 , X n−1 such that V n−1 is a random variable representing the uniformly distributed message M and p X n−1 |V n−1 is defined by the encoder of the [R, n] code (either deterministic or stochastic), as done in the proof of [29, Lemma 4] . Since (A.14) holds for all sufficiently large n, it follows from [43, Thm. 3.19 ] that lim inf 5 As the supremum is defined as the least upper bound [43, Def. 1.8], it follows that if every achievable secrecy rate R s is not larger than a given real number γ ∈ R, then the supremum of all achievable secrecy rates, C s , is also not larger than γ . This proves the lemma. 6 The Markov chain
Proof:
for all s 0 ∈ S 0 , see, e.g., [65] . 
and
where (a) and (b) follow since the n-MGMWTC is n-block memoryless, hence, the channel outputs and the probability of error are independent of the initial state, when the length of the codeword is an integer multiple of n. Denote this code by C MG b·n , and recall that from the definition of the n-MGMWTC, it follows that the decoders at the intended receiver and at the eavesdropper use only the last n−m channel outputs out of each block of n consecutive channel outputs of the LGMWTC. Let LG by 7 LG,a to be equal to the codeword used for transmitting ζ using the C MG b·n code, i.e., X l−1
LG,a = X LG,a + U a and also Z MG =ḠX b·n−1 MG + U 0 , which implies thatZ LG and Z MG both have the same statistical characterization. Consequently,
LG,a ;Z LG M LG to be the all zero vector, and by applying the reverse of the transition from (a) to (b).
Next, letZ l−1 denote the entire set of l vector channel outputs obtained when transmitting using the code C
LG l . When this transmission is applied, the information leakage rate for the LGMWTC satisfies
where (a) follows from the chain rule for mutual information [52, Ch. 2.5]; (b) follows since when using the code C LG l , the first a channel outputs depend only on the initial state and the noise, hence, M andZ a−1 are mutually independent; (c)
LG is all zeros, thus ∃Ǧ ∈ R n e ·a×n t ·m such that 
The code rate for C
LG l is obtained from
where (a) follows from (A.18c). Thus, for sufficiently large b,
, it follows that R LG ≥ R s − 3 . It therefore follows that for all sufficiently large b and a ∈ {m, m + 1, . . . , n + m − 1}, there exists a code for the LGMWTC with blocklength l = b · n + a which satisfies (4a)-(4c We next prove that in the limit of n → ∞, the n-CGMWTC and the n-MGMWTC have the same secrecy capacity. This is done in the following steps:
• First, we obtain in Lemma A.6 an expression for the secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC, C n−CG s , by proving that it can be transformed into an equivalent memoryless MIMO WTC.
• Next, in Lemma A.7 we prove that for a single n-block, the mutual information between the channel input and
the last n − m channel outputs is the same for both the n-CGMWTC and the n-MGMWTC.
• Then, we show in Lemma A.8 that the mutual information between the channel inputs and any m channel outputs of the n-CGMWTC can be upper bounded by a fixed and finite number. 
Proof: The proof of this lemma follows the same outline as in the proof of Proposition A.1. We first show that (A.22) characterizes the maximum achievable secrecy rate when considering only codes whose blocklength is an integer multiple of n, i.e, [R, b · n] codes where b is a positive integer. This is proved by transforming the n-CGMWTC into an equivalent memoryless MIMO WTC using a bijective transformation, and then characterizing the capacity of the transformed channel. Then, we show that every secrecy rate achievable for the n-CGMWTC can be achieved by considering only codes whose blocklength is an integer multiple of n.
Let us consider the n-CGMWTC subject to the constraint that only codes with blocklengths that are integer multiples of n are allowed. In this case we can transform the channel into an equivalent n · n t × n · n r × n · n e memoryless MIMO wiretap channel without loss of information, via the following assignment: Define the input of the transformed channel by the n · n t × 1 vector X eq ĩ X ĩ +1 ·n−1 i·n ,ĩ ≥ 0, the output at the intended receiver by the n · n r × 1 vector
, and the output at the eavesdropper by the n · n e × 1 vectorZ eq ĩ Z ĩ +1 ·n−1
i·n
. The transformation is clearly bijective thus, the secrecy capacity of the transformed channel is equal to the secrecy capacity of the original channel. Since the n-CGMWTC is n-block memoryless, it follows from Def. 6 and Def. 7 that the transformed MIMO channel is memoryless. The outputs at the intended receiver and at the eavesdropper are corrupted by the additive noise vectorsW eq ĩ W From the construction of the transformed equivalent channel, the definition of the noises for the n-CGMWTC in the proof outline of Thm. 1, and of block-memorylessness in Def. 7, it follows that bothW eq ĩ andŨ eq ĩ are i.i.d. and mutually independent. The secrecy capacity of the transformed channel, denoted C eq n , can be written in the form of the result of Csiszár and Körner [2, Eq. (11)]:
where the constraint E X[i ] 2 ≤ P, ∀0 ≤ i < n follows from the per-symbol power constraint of the n-CGMWTC. As each MIMO channel use corresponds to n channel uses in the original channel, it follows that the achievable secrecy rate of the n-CGMWTC, subject to the constraint that only codes with blocklengths that are integer multiples of n are allowed, in bits per channel use, is 1 n C eq n , which coincides with (A.22). Next, we show that any secrecy rate achievable for the n-CGMWTC can be achieved by considering only codes with blocklengths that are integer multiples of n: Consider a secrecy rate R s achievable for the n-CGMWTC and fix 1 , 2 , and 3 to arbitrary positive real numbers. From Def. 4 it follows that ∃n 0 > 0 such that ∀l > n 0 there exists an [R, l] code which satisfies (4a)-(4c). Thus, by setting b 0 as the smallest integer such that b 0 · n ≥ n 0 it follows that for all integer b > b 0 there exists a [R, b · n] code which satisfies (4a)-(4c). Therefore, the secrecy rate R s is also achievable when considering only codes whose blocklength is an integer multiple of n. We therefore conclude that (A.22) denotes the maximum achievable secrecy rate for the n-CGMWTC, which completes the proof of the lemma.
Lemma A.7: For any joint distribution p
form a Markov chain, the channel outputs of the n-MGMWTC and of the n-CGMWTC satisfy
It follows from (2) and (8) are identically distributed, as both are zeromean real Gaussian random vectors with the same correlation matrix: To see this, the ∀i 1 , i 2 ∈ {m, m + 1, . . . , n − 1} we write
where (b) follows from (7a) as |i 1 − i 2 | < n − m. It therefore follows that 
Now, for any given joint distribution p V n−1 , X n−1 , it follows from (A.28a) that
where (a) follows from the chain rule for mutual information [52, Sec. 2.5] and the fact that mutual information is nonnegative; (b) follows from Lemma A.7. From Lemma A.6 it follows that
where (a) follows from (A.29). Next, for any given p V n−1 , X n−1 , we also have the following relationship
where (a) follows from Lemma A.7; (b) follows from (A.28b); (c) follows from the chain rule for mutual information [52, Sec. 2.5] and as mutual information is non-negative which
where ( 
for all blocklengths l, and specifically, for each n-block of the n-CGMWTC we require,
We denote the secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC subject to (B.1) with C n−CG s,T A . The derivation consists of the following steps:
• First, in Lemma B.1 we show that applying the DFT transforms the n-CGMWTC into a set of independent parallel MIMO WTCs. We then explain that any achievable rate for the n-CGMWTC can be obtained by considering only codewords whose length is an integer multiple of n.
• Next, in Lemma B.2 we derive the maximal achievable secrecy rate given a fixed power allocation, when the blocklength is an integer multiple of n, by a simple extension of the results of [19, Thm. 1] . We conclude that C n−CG s,T A can be written as a maximization of the sum of the per-subchannel secrecy capacities over all power allocations satisfying a specified sum-power constraint.
• Then, in Lemma B.3 we characterize symmetry conditions on the maximal achievable secrecy rate expression and on the optimal input distribution for the n-CGMWTC, subject to (B.1). This results in an explicit expression for C n−CG s,T A stated in (B.14).
• Lastly, in Corollary B.1 we prove that C n−CG s = C n−CG s,T A . The approach of characterizing the capacity of a channel subject to a per-symbol power constraint by considering a time-averaged power constraint was also used in [31] for the point-to-point LTI channel (without an eavesdropper).
We begin with some preliminary properties of the multivariate DFT defined in (1) . Recall that in (1) . Hence, we can write
can be obtained
k=0 . Note thatq[0] is real for any n and thatq n 2 is real for even n. P3 Parseval's relationship for the multivariate DFT is given
P4 The DFT of a multivariate circular convolution is the product of the corresponding DFT sequences: Let n q 1 , n q 2 ∈ N, and consider the pair of sequences of length n,
A. Step 1: Transforming the n-CGMWTC Into a Set of Independent Parallel MIMO WTCs
Focusing on the n-CGMWTC, consider the input sequence transmitted during one n-block, X n−1 , and the corresponding channel outputs observed at the intended receiver and at the eavesdropper, denotedỸ n−1 andZ n−1 , respectively. Recall that by definition of the n-CGMWTC, the outputs are independent of the initial channel state S 0 . For τ ∈ N define the zero-padded extensions of the Tx-Rx and of the Tx-Ev channel impulse responses byH
[τ ] = 0 n r ×n t andG[τ ] = 0 n e ×n t for m < τ < n. Using these definitions, Eqn. (8) can be written as
(B.3a)
, and
be the n-
, and , respectively (see Subsection III-B) and property P4 for the DFT of a multivariate circular convolution, we obtain the following relationships: for deriving the secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC. Define next
The average power constraint (B.1) yields a per n-block power constraint
where (a) follows from Parseval's relationship (property P3).
, it follows that P n−k = P k must hold. In conclusion, when the codeword length is an integer multiple of n, then the secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC (8) subject to the time-averaged power constraint (B.1) is equal to the secrecy capacity of the memoryless WTC (B.4) subject to the power constraint (B.6).
Finally, as explained in the last paragraph in the proof of Lemma A.6, the capacity of the n-CGMWTC can be completely characterized by considering only codewords whose length is an integer multiple of n. 
The proof follows similar arguments to those used in the proof in [33, Appendix B] for scalar noises and is thus omitted here. Please refer to [64] for the detailed proof.
Since the noises
are mutually independent it follows that the channels (B.4) are parallel Gaussian channels.
B. Step 2: The Maximal Achievable Secrecy Rate
(B.8)
Note that R k n (P k ) represents the secrecy capacity of an n t × n r ×n e memoryless MIMO WTC with additive Gaussian noise i.i.d. in time, subject to input power constraint P k [ 
denote the maximal achievable secrecy rate for the WTC (B.4) subject to a given a set of per-channel
Lemma B.2: When the codeword length is restricted to be
an integer multiple of n, R n {P k } n 2 k=0 satisfies:
Proof: From Lemma B.1 we have that the noises at each subchannel k are each i.i.d. over different n-blocks, and that the noises at subchannel k are independent of the noises at all other subchannels. It thus follows that (B.4) can be considered as k=0 when the codeword length is an integer multiple of n; The secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC subject to the power constraint (B.1) is therefore obtained by finding the assignment of
k=0 which maximizes (B.9) subject to (B.6) while the set P k n−1 k=0 is constrained to satisfy P n−k = P k for every 1 ≤ k < n 2 . As each of the n 2 channel uses -one for each subchannel in the set of n 2 parallel subchannels, corresponds to n channel uses of the n-CGMWTC, we can summarize the above discussion in the following result
Step 3: Deriving an Explicit Expression for the Maximization (B.10)
DefineL n asL n = {0} for n odd andL n = 0, n 2 for n even. From Lemma B.1, it follows that for 1 ≤ k < n 2 , the k-th subchannel is a complex memoryless MIMO WTC with circularly symmetric complex normal additive white Gaussian noise. For the remaining values of k, i.e., for k ∈L n , it follows from Lemma B.1 that the k-th subchannel is a real memoryless Gaussian MIMO WTC. For a fixed ρ ≥ 0, let Q ρ be the set of n t × n t Hermitian positive semi-definite matrices Q such that Tr (Q) ≤ ρ. We define 8 
. Note that due to Hermitian and positive definiteness of the covariance matrices of the noises we have that
where (a) follows from [61, Ch. 3.6] , and from plugging . This proves the lemma. be the set of n matrices which maximize (B.14). From the derivation of the secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC subject to a time-averaged power constraint (B.1) derived in subsections B-A -B-C we note the following characteristics of the optimal channel input:
• As X[i ] is a real multivariate sequence it follows from the properties of the DFT that for
• From the secrecy capacity for real-valued memoryless Gaussian MIMO WTCs [11 [k] .
• As the subchannels are independent, the optimal input which achieves (B.14) satisfies p X are zero-mean and mutually independent, thus E X [k 1 ] (X[k 2 ]) H is non zero only when k 2 = k 1 9 Note that the real-valued memoryless Gaussian MIMO WTC is a special case of the real-valued memoryless Gaussian MIMO BC with common and confidential messages studied in [11] , when there is no common message and only a single confidential message. 10 Note that [6] showed that circularly symmetric complex normal inputs are optimal for complex memoryless Gaussian MIMO WTCs with additive circularly-symmetric complex normal (ACSCN) noise, subject to the more general time-averaged power constraint, which subsumes the per-symbol power constraint. It directly follows from [6] and [63, Lemma 1] that the optimal codeword that achieves the secrecy capacity in [6] also satisfies the per-symbol power constraint. Thus, we conclude that circularly symmetric complex normal input are also optimal for complex memoryless Gaussian MIMO WTCs with ACSCN noise subject to the per-symbol power constraint. , and noting that it is enough to consider blocklengths which are integer multiples of n to characterize the secrecy capacity of the n-CGMWTC, proves that C n−CG s is obtained by (10) . APPENDIX C PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4 In order to prove Proposition 4, we first show that if (11) is satisfied, then the secrecy capacity of the LGMWTC, C s , is strictly positive; then, we prove that if C s is strictly positive, it follows that (11) must be satisfied. The proof follows a similar outline to that of [ where the transformation is bijective as we consider only codes with blocklength which is an integer multiple of n PLC . It follows from Thm. 1 that the secrecy capacity of the equivalent MIMO WTC (D.2) is given by n PLC · C s,P LC , where C s,P LC is given by (15c), subject to (15a). Since each channel input in the equivalent MIMO channel corresponds to n PLC channel inputs in the original NB-PLC WTC, the corollary follows for codes whose blocklength which is an integer multiple of n PLC . Lastly, we note that as n PLC is fixed and finite, then any achievable secrecy rate can be achieved using codes whose blocklength is an integer multiple of n PLC , where the proof is similar to that of Proposition A.1 and of Lemma A.6.
